Apartheid South Africa Reacts to MK Incursions from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia On 30 November 1979, apartheid Prime Minister P.W. Botha addressed a function in Vootrekkerhoogte (now Thaba Tshwane), Pretoria, held in honour of the outgoing Chief of the South African Air Force, Lieutenant General Bob Rogers, mentioning that South Africa was looking at ways and means to protect its interests, including its vital lines of communication, such as the rail link to Beitbridge and the railway links through it.
The apartheid government, according to Botha, was consequently in discussions with the newly established government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, since ANC (African National Congress) “terrorists” were collaborating with the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front in harming South African interests. For Botha, “No right thinking person can expect Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to protect these interests in the midst of her own problems”. In his address, Botha was reacting to intelligence trends analysis during November 1979 that was disturbing to apartheid South Africa’s security forces. The intelligence was relating to Botswana and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which was prior to March 1978 referred to as Rhodesia.
On March 1978, Ian Smith and puppet-African leaders Abel Muzorewa, Jeremiah Chirau and Ndabaningi Sithole signed an agreement, which led to elections in April 1979 that were ultimately won by Muzorewa. However, in August 1979, the Commonwealth called for a new constitution leading to a general ceasefire and fresh elections under British Supervision. Accordingly, both the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government and the liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU, allied under the Patriotic Front, were since September 1979 undergoing constitutional negotiations at Lancaster House, in London, Britain, while the government faced stiff armed resistance from the same movements. On 11 November 1979, the apartheid South African Defence Force’s (SADF) Northern Transvaal Command sent a message to the SADF Headquarters that Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guides at Kasane, on the Botswana side of the Zambezi River, had informed a source that in two to three weeks-time they would be escorting guerrillas from Zambia to Botswana and then to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, before they would be transferred into South Africa.
Again, on 20 November 1979, apartheid Military Intelligence processed a report from a source that about seventeen MK “terrorists” were anticipated to arrive in Selibe-Phikwe on 21 November 1979, with the intention of penetrating South Africa in the vicinity of Martinsdrift. The following day, a ZIPRA guerrilla was captured and interrogated in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, speaking in IsiNdebele, wherein he indicated that he was part of a group that operated jointly with MK in the Patana area and east of the Tuli circle in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia for a long time. The ZIPRA guerrilla mentioned that together with the ANC members, they resided in camps near Selibe-Phikwe, at Dukwe near Fancistown, and at Kabajango, from where they advanced into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to undertake joint operations. In most instances the MK “terrorists” moved further south into South Africa. During the interrogation, he also mentioned that he heard the MK guerrillas talking about reinforcements, as there were plans to infiltrate South Africa during the November-December rainy season when the bush became thicker. Frequently, MK cadres used dim green uniforms or civilian clothes and they were often supplied with AK-47 folding butt rifles, hand grenades and TNT explosive blocks.
This information from the captured ZIPRA cadre was “confirmed” by a document that reported approximately 200 MK “terrorists” in Francistown, Botswana, which were intending to reach South Africa in small groups. According to the report, the “terrorists” were being helped by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). Consequently, the South African security forces were contemplating a military intervention, as P.W. Botha hinted in his address in Pretoria on 30 November 1979. The racist Rhodesians and their fascist counterparts in South Africa had anticipated that when the Conservatives government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took power in the United Kingdom on 3 May 1979, it would recognise the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government of Bishop Muzorewa. Moreover, Margaret Thatcher had made clear her support for the Internal Settlement, describing both ZANLA and ZIPRA as “terrorists”.
This infuriated the Commonwealth member states, thus subjecting the United Kingdom to tremendous pressure to withdraw its recognition of the Muzorewa government, or else Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would be expelled from the arrangement. Furthermore, threats were made to boycott British Petroleum (BP) and to cut ties with British exports. Lastly, the United States’ Jimmy Carter administration wanted an immediate resolution of the Rhodesian question. Thus Thatcher was forced to concede and accept defeat. Consequently, apartheid South African security forces’ intended military intervention in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would have been a huge blunder, as it would have jeopardized the ongoing Lancaster House negotiations, and was involuntarily aborted.
By Castro Khwela